25 ideas
| 10170 | While true-in-a-model seems relative, true-in-all-models seems not to be [Reck/Price] |
| 10166 | ZFC set theory has only 'pure' sets, without 'urelements' [Reck/Price] |
| 10175 | Three types of variable in second-order logic, for objects, functions, and predicates/sets [Reck/Price] |
| 10165 | 'Analysis' is the theory of the real numbers [Reck/Price] |
| 10174 | Mereological arithmetic needs infinite objects, and function definitions [Reck/Price] |
| 10164 | Peano Arithmetic can have three second-order axioms, plus '1' and 'successor' [Reck/Price] |
| 10172 | Set-theory gives a unified and an explicit basis for mathematics [Reck/Price] |
| 10167 | Structuralism emerged from abstract algebra, axioms, and set theory and its structures [Reck/Price] |
| 10169 | Relativist Structuralism just stipulates one successful model as its arithmetic [Reck/Price] |
| 10179 | There are 'particular' structures, and 'universal' structures (what the former have in common) [Reck/Price] |
| 10181 | Pattern Structuralism studies what isomorphic arithmetic models have in common [Reck/Price] |
| 10182 | There are Formalist, Relativist, Universalist and Pattern structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 10168 | Formalist Structuralism says the ontology is vacuous, or formal, or inference relations [Reck/Price] |
| 10178 | Maybe we should talk of an infinity of 'possible' objects, to avoid arithmetic being vacuous [Reck/Price] |
| 10176 | Universalist Structuralism is based on generalised if-then claims, not one particular model [Reck/Price] |
| 10177 | Universalist Structuralism eliminates the base element, as a variable, which is then quantified out [Reck/Price] |
| 10171 | The existence of an infinite set is assumed by Relativist Structuralism [Reck/Price] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 10173 | A nominalist might avoid abstract objects by just appealing to mereological sums [Reck/Price] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
| 6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
| 6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |